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Abstract
John Austin has been widely criticized and supported in equal measure for his bold assertion that 
international law is not ‘real law’ due to the lack of a ‘sovereign’. This article explores Austin’s position and 
analyzes it as against its veracity in relation to current legal systems; modern contemporary international 
law; and analysis of legal questions in the international arena. While indeed Austin’s position was true 
about the legal systems of his time, the same cannot be transposed into the international legal system. If 
on the other hand the transposition is necessary, it will be shown that international law is indeed ‘real law’ 
with a somewhat real ‘sovereign’ just like any municipal law.
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Intisari
John Austin telah banyak dikritik dan banyak dipuji mengenai pendapatnya bahwa hukum internasional 
bukanlah hukum yang sebenarnya karena tidak adanya penguasa. Artikel ini membahas tentang posisi 
Austin dan menganalisis kebenarannya sehubungan dengan sistem hukum saat ini; hukum internasional 
modern kontemporer; dan analisis atas pertanyaan hukum di arena internasional. Walaupun posisi Austin 
adalah benar tentang sistem hukum di masanya, hal tersebut tidak dapat diposisikan untuk sistem hukum 
internasional. Apabila penempatan tersebut diperlukan, akan terlihat bahwa hukum internasional adalah 
hukum yang sebenarnya, dengan semacam ‘penguasa’ yang sebenarnya, sama seperti hukum nasional 
lainnya. 
Kata Kunci: penguasa, hukum internasional, kekuasaan.
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A. Introduction
John Austin through his positivist theory 
postulated that international law is not true law.1 He 
took the position that international law is not really 
law as it has no sovereign. Austin postulated that 
law is a genus of command. He defined a command 
as “an intimation or expression of a wish to do or 
forbear from doing something, backed up by the 
power to do harm to the actor in case he disobeys.” 
Further, he opined that ‘the person to whom the 
command is given is under a “duty” to obey it’, 
and the threatened harm is defined as a “sanction.”2 
This position was heavily critiqued by H.L A. Hart 
who was of the view that “the idea that law consists 
merely of orders backed by threats is inadequate to 
explain modern legal systems.”3
Moreover, since the 19th century, there has 
been an ongoing controversy as to whether inter-
national law is law or not. Some arguments have 
been advanced that international law is positive law 
while others have said that international law is only 
a body of rules of international morality. This is a 
debate that this article endeavors to dissect.
Austin went on to define real law as commands 
of a ‘sovereign.’ According to him, a ‘sovereign’ is 
a person who received the arbitral obedience of the 
society and who in turn did not owe such obedience 
to anyone. By this analogy, rules of international 
law did not qualify as rules of positive law and not 
being commands of any sort, and hence were placed 
in a category of laws ‘improperly so called’.4
This essentially questions the viability 
of international law as ‘real-law’ more so since 
according to Austin, international law was positive 
international morality only and similar to the by-
laws binding a members club,’5 a position that was 
highly criticized by Hart as will be seen below. In 
essence, if international law is similar to the by-laws 
binding a members club as postulated by Austin, this 
assertion could principally be read into the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda as found in The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLTT).
The VCLT is widely considered to be the most 
definitive authority on treaty law and practice, makes 
reference to pacta sunt servanda as a universal rule 
in its Preamble and also devotes Article 26 to its 
definition.6 This is also in principle drawn Article 
2 (2) of the UN Charter which provides that: “All 
Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights 
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill 
in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the present Charter.”7
The good faith element of this principle 
suggests that States should take the necessary 
steps to uphold the provisions of the treaty.8 This 
in essence, resonates with Austin’s assertion of 
international law being similar to the ‘by-laws 
binding a members club’. This would mean that 
States can decide whether or not to exercise good 
faith in their upholding of international law by 
virtue of being ‘members of the same international 
body, namely the UN. But again, this is pegged on 
the fact of the linkage with the ‘command theory’ to 
international law which is herein analyzed.
This article endeavors to analyze the context 
of Austin’s assertion that ‘international law is not 
real law’. This analysis will be contextualized vis­à­
vis the support and criticisms advanced towards the 
same. Further, In lieu of Austin’s Command Theory, 
this article breaks down the theory in the realm of 
international law and its normative irrelevance 
in international law in three thematic areas: That 
modern historical jurisprudence discounted the 
force of Austin because there is no legal system 
1 John Austin, 1832, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 123.
2 Gautam Bhatia, “The Command Theory of Law: A Brief Summary, and Hart’s Objections”, http://legaltheoryandjurisprudence.blogspot.
nl/2008/05/command-theory-of-law-brief-summary-and.html, accessed 9 November 2015.
3 Ibid.
4 John Austin, Op. cit., p. 171.
5 Ibid.
6 Article 26 of The VCLT states, “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” 
7 Article 2 (2) of The UN Charter.
8 Andrew Solomon, “Pacta Sunt Servanda”, http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_0908/generalprinciples.html, accessed on 14 November 
2015.
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that conforms to this concept; That Austin’s view 
has been overtaken by events more so in modern 
contemporary international law realm; and that 
questions of international law are always treated 
as legal questions in the international arena. These 
thematic analysis will caste a light on Austin’s 
theory and show that international law is indeed 
‘real law’.
B. Discussion
1. Hart’s Command Theory
John Austin, in his writings concluded that 
international law rules are not really law, since 
unlike domestic norms they are not enforced by 
sovereign sanctions. “The duties which international 
law imposes,” Austin wrote, “are enforced by moral 
sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, or by fear 
on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general 
hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case 
they shall violate maxims generally received and 
respected.”9
This assertion by Austin indicates that if a 
law does not flow from the will of a determinate 
sovereign then it is not real law. It elicits the 
notion of “No political sovereign, no law”. Hence, 
international law, in Austin’s writings, can become 
positive law only under a global empire whose 
rulers command the obedience of all subordinate 
states.10 
Austin’s assertion on a sovereign authority in 
order to make a law, real law, has been met with 
support and criticisms alike. In supporting his 
assertion, some have argued that Austin is being 
misquoted, in that he always meant the notion of 
institutional authority and never the individuals 
who head these institutions.11 This basically entails 
the position that the sovereign authority that Austin 
speaks of, is in the institutional framework within 
the context of making laws e.g. Parliament- and 
never in the individuals who play a role within 
the institution in the exercise of their functions of 
making laws e.g. legislators. This construction seeks 
to separate the notion of ‘individual command’ from 
‘institutional sovereignty.’
In addition, one could take the position12 that 
the sovereign is best understood as a constructive 
metaphor to mean that it should be viewed as a 
reflection of a single will.13 This assertion by Harris 
points towards an all-inclusive view of the rules of 
international law. Laws should not be constructed 
in isolation but as a totality of the will of the people 
to choose representatives to represent them in the 
law making institutions, to make laws that they will 
abide by. Hence, the ‘command’ theory is merely 
a ‘constructive metaphor’ that indicates that rules 
by the institutions and the rulers are binding and 
obeyed as if the people willed each of the rules.14 
It connotes an aspect of democracy in the sense of 
representation of the people, by the people, for the 
people.15
On the other hand, criticisms have also 
been advanced against his assertion. Hans Kelsen 
critiqued Austin’s command theory and indicated 
that, “in many societies, it is hard to identify a 
“sovereign” in line with Austin’s allusion. This 
is due to the fact that the focus on a “sovereign” 
makes it difficult to explain the continuity of legal 
systems: a new ruler will not come in with the kind 
9 See also Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2101, accessed on 
9 November 2015.
10 C. Van Kuijck, “What is The Law of Nations According to John Austin”, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B2QkK3X99hLJb1ZjRXhDbmRGRjQ/
edit?usp=sharing, accessed on 14 November 2015.
11 Cottrell, Rogerotterrell, 2003, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, LexisNexis, London, p. 63. See 
also, Brian Bix, “John Austin: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/austin-john/ , 
accessed on 14 November 2015.
12 See , J.W. Harris, “The Concept of Sovereign Will”, Acta Juridica Journal, Vol.II, 1979, pp. 1–15. See also, Brian Bix, Loc. cit.
13 See Brian Bix, Loc. cit.
14 William E. Conklin, 2001, The Invisible Origins of Legal Positivism: A Re-Reading of a Tradition, Kluwer Academic Publishers, New York, 
p. 140.
15 “Government of the people, by the people, for the people, […].” See Abraham Lincoln, “The Gettysburg Address Gettysburg Pennsylvania”, 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm , accessed on 18 November 2015.
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of “habit of obedience” that Austin sets as a criterion 
for a system’s rule-maker.”16 Kelsen goes further to 
explain the concept of continuity of legal systems 
in that, a legal obligation does not exist because 
the maker of the obligation exists, it is not tied to 
the person who enacted the norm. A statute, unless 
repealed, will remain binding even after all members 
of the parliament that enacted it have passed away. 
In the enactment of laws, legislators enact them 
and yet they are not explicitly familiar with their 
content. Hence, what explains the persistence of 
legal norms is the continuing existence of a system 
of norms of which the enacted norm has come to 
form a part.17
Hart on the other hand alluded to the fact 
that the word “command” implies a hierarchical 
structure of individualistic power, with law. But 
this assertion is not reflected in today’s legal 
systems, as legislation often have a self-binding 
force. It is often said that a legislator exhibits two 
personalities: his legislative personality, which is 
tasked with giving the command, and his ordinary 
personality, as a citizen, which is bound to obey 
the commands given. Hart further argues that such 
a complicated device is unnecessary to explain 
the self-binding nature of legislation. He indicates 
that legislation can be viewed as a promise, which 
creates obligations upon the promisor. And in any 
event, much of legislation is done under the ambit 
of pre-existing rules of procedure, which bind the 
legislators themselves.18
In lieu of Austin’s Command Theory, this 
paper will seek to break down the theory in the 
realm of international law and its normative 
irrelevance in international law in three thematic 
areas: First, modern historical jurisprudence 
discounted the force of Austin because there is no 
legal system that conforms to this concept (Modern 
historical jurisprudence). Second, Austin’s view 
has been overtaken by events more so in modern 
contemporary international law realm (Modern 
contemporary international law). Third, questions 
of international law are always treated as legal 
questions in the international arena (Questions of 
international law).
2. Modern Historical Jurisprudence
Modern jurisprudence indicates no difference 
between communities that do not have a determinate 
foreign legislative authority, and that of any state 
with the legislative authority. In both systems, the 
law is enforced and observed and do not differ in its 
binding operation. Austin defined laws ‘properly so 
called’ as commands of a ‘sovereign.’19 International 
law according to Austin is consigned to positive 
morality, as it does not flow from the will of a 
sovereign but ‘consists of opinions and sentiments 
current among nations’.20 Hence, according to 
Austin, because the rules of international law did not 
qualify as rules of positive law and there not being a 
determinate sovereign from whom the independent 
nations owed arbitral obedience of such rules, they 
did not meet the threshold of being classified as true 
law.21
H.L.A Hart, the disciple of Austin in the 20th 
Century era rejected the command theory of law 
and placed international law in a special category 
of ‘law’.22 His rejection was based on the notion 
that law is the command of a legislator to a citizen 
backed by the threat of punishment as asserted by 
Austin. Austin’s insistence on sanctions has led 
to many questions as to the essential nature of 
sanctions so as for a system of law to be regarded as 
law. The most satisfactory response to the concept of 
sanctions was issued by Sir Frederick Pollock who 
16 Hans Kelsen,“The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 55, 1941, pp. 54-66. See also, Brian Bix, 
Loc. cit.
17 Hans Kelsen, 1945, General Theory of Law and State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p. 32. See also, Lars Vink, “Austin, Kelsen, and 
the Model of Sovereignty: Notes on the History of Modern Legal Positivism” in Freeman and Patricia Mindus , “The Legacy of John Austin’s 
Jurisprudence”, Law and Philosophy Library, Vol. 103, p. 7.
18 H.L.A Hart, 1994, The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 10. See also Gautam Bhatia, Loc. cit.
19 John Austin, Loc. cit.
20 Ibid. See also, C. Van Kuijck, Loc. cit.
21 Ibid., p. 171.
22 H.L.A. Hart, Loc. cit.
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opined that a legal system requires the existence of 
a political class, and the recognition by its members 
of settled rules binding upon them.23
Judging by Pollock’s response, international 
law indeed does qualify as a system of law. It 
satisfies all three conditions. First, there is a 
political community of 193 member states which 
are considered to be equal in the international 
law realm.24 This is despite the various political, 
economic and cultural divisions within the various 
states or as George Orwell puts it in the book Animal 
Farm, ‘all animals are equal but some animals are 
more equal than others.’25 
Secondly, there is a system of rules and 
principles that comprise the international legal 
order. The UN Charter acts as the ‘Constitution’ of 
the United Nations and Article 2 provides the key 
principles that the member States of the UN are 
to act in accordance with; principles such as good 
faith, sovereign equality and peaceful settlement of 
international disputes.26 
Thirdly, the members of the international 
community recognize these rules and principles 
as binding upon them. The legally binding force 
of international law has been severally asserted by 
nations of the world for instance in an international 
conference, e.g. the UN Charter is grounded on 
the true legality of international law whereas 
Article 38 of Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ICJ Statute’) 
indicates that ‘a function of the court is to decide in 
accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it.’27
Austin perhaps confused rules of ‘international 
law proper’ with rules of Comitas Gentium 
(International Comity), the latter being viewed as 
good will and civility founded on the moral right of 
each State to receive courtesy from another State. 
Non-observance of a rule of international law may 
give rise to a claim by one State against others as 
some kind of satisfaction whether it be diplomatic 
in character or whether it takes the concrete form of 
indemnity or reparation, its otherwise the rules of 
international comity.28
Besides, the binding force of international 
law can be traced back to the supreme fundamental 
principle expressed by the principles of ‘pacta sunt 
servanda’.29 That is to say that agreements between 
States are to be respected and carried out in good 
faith. This principle of good faith is an absolute 
postulate of the international legal system and 
manifests itself in all rules of international law. 
Hence, States comply with international law for 
reasons other than the threat of a sanction. This 
means that ‘international law is not binding because 
it is enforced, but it is enforced because it is already 
binding.’30
3. Modern Contemporary International Law
 In the last one century or so, a great number 
of international law rules have come into existence 
as a result of law making treaties and convention and 
the proportion of rules of customary international 
law has considerably diminished.31
This act of codification of customary 
international law is undertaken so as to clarify the 
law and promote compliance. This need for clarity 
is hinged on the fact that customary international 
law has a reputation for vagueness and ambiguity.32 
23 J. L. Brierly, 1963, The Law of Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 1. See also Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, 1992, Oppenheim’s 
International Law, Longman, London, pp. 9-13.
24 See Article 2 (1) UN Charter. See also Case Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
29 October 1997, para. 40.
25 George Orwell, 1946, Animal Farm, Penguin Group, London, p. 112.
26 See, John Dugard, 1994, International Law, A South African Perspective, Juta & Co. Ltd, Capetown, p. 9.
27 Ibid.
28 See, Hans J. Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism and International Law” AJIL, Vol. 34, 1940, p. 260. See also Louis Henkin., 1979, How 
Nations Behave- Law and Foreign Policy 2 ed, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 58-63.
29 See, Article 26 VCLT. See also Article 2 (2) UN Charter.
30 See, G.G Fitzmaurice, “The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement”, Modern Law Review, 
Vol.19, Issue 1, 1956, p. 1-13. See also, John Dugard, Op. cit., p. 10.
31 United Nations, 2011, Report of the International. Law Commission. Sixty-third Session 26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011, United 
Nations, New York, p. 15.
32 See Associated Press, “India: Airport Pat-Down Draws Protest”, N.Y. TIMES, 10 December 2010. 
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Claims that codification clarifies the law, in 
particular, are a myriad.33 In principle, codification 
allows states to specify more precisely what 
customary international law requires, thereby 
facilitating deeper cooperation and avoiding costly 
disputes over vague legal rules.34 Codification also 
introduces the possibility of attaching compliance-
promoting mechanisms—such as protocols granting 
international tribunals’ jurisdiction over disputes—
to customary rules.35
Subsequently, if it be true that there is 
no deter minate sovereign legislative authority 
in the inter national law field, the procedure for 
formulation of rules of international law by means 
of international conferences or through existing 
international institutions is practically as settled and 
efficient as any State legislative procedure. In any 
State’s legislative procedure, the role of legislation 
is to stipulate rights and obligations. It lays down 
powers, privileges and duties. It states what can 
and cannot be done. The rule of law promotes good 
governance and stimulates development for without 
law, there is chaos. Hence, it is important to look at 
the concept of a sovereign at the municipal level as 
well as at the international level as against Austin’s 
assertion and the viability of the ‘command theory.’
4. The Concept of Sovereign at a Municipal 
Level
In lieu of Austin’s command theory, a 
journey back into time is necessary so as to be able 
to develop the link to his command theory. In the 
middle ages, power was always concentrated in the 
hands of one person (an autocrat). This autocrat 
was also known to be divine in that all secular and 
religious power was encompassed in his hands. The 
autocrats were considered as gods and challenging 
them was more or less an act of signing your own 
death certificate and handing it to them. Examples 
include the Egyptian Pharaohs and Roman 
Emperors. Examples of these kinds of autocrats can 
be deduced from the Bible in the books of Exodus 
and in the Gospels as well.36
Thereafter, in 1215, came the adoption 
of the Magna Carta (“the Great Charter”). The 
Magna Carta was an important document because 
it established the key principle that everyone is 
subject to the law, even the king, (emphasis added) 
and guarantees the rights of individuals, the right 
to justice and the right to a fair trial.37 This law 
replaced the autocratic powers of rulers to create 
a system of checks and balances by other leaders 
e.g. the legislature.38 Hence, the law placed a cap 
on the powers of the king in that the assembly of 
barons as they were known in England would check 
the King against excesses and as such the king was 
effectively below the law.
Further, the Magna Carta influenced what is 
now known as the two-House system in the United 
Kingdom - The House of Commons and the House 
of Lords; whose work is similar, in that they are 
involved in law making as well as scrutiny of the 
government’s work.39 This bicameral approach has 
been adopted by various nations around the world 
or the unicameral approach of just one-House 
33 See, R. Baxter, “Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law”, BYIL, Vol. XLI, 1965-1966, pp. 275-300. He argues that 
treaties codifying law may influence, shape, and alter the law in signatory countries). See also Richard Falk, “Reparations, International Law, 
and Global Justice: A New Frontier”, in Pablo de Greiff, 2006, The Handbook Of Reparations, The International Center for Transnational 
Justice, New York, pp. 478, 480. He argues that “noting that the purpose of international law is to “codif[y] behavioral trends in state practice 
and shift political attitudes on the part of governments with the intention of stabilizing and clarifying expectations about the future”. See 
also Bing Bing Jia, “The Relations Between Treaties and Custom”, Chinese Journal of. International Law, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2010, p.108. He 
argues that “Noting that the purpose of international law is to “codify international law […]”. See also Hers Lauterpacht, “Codification and 
Development of International Law”, Am. J. Int’l L., Vol. 16, 1955, p.19. He argues that “noting that the purpose of international law is to codify 
behavioral trends in state practice and shift politic of international law.” See also Scobbie I., “The Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach 
of ‘Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International Law”, Eur. J. Int’l L., 2002.
34 Meyer T., “Codifying Custom”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 160, 1995, p. 100.
35 Ibid.
36 Theweakerparty, “The Legislature­ Definition and Historical Background”, http://theweakerparty.wikispaces.com/The+Legislature++Definit
ion+and+Historical+Background, accessed 8 December 2015.
37 British Library, “Magna Carta: An Introduction”, http://www.bl.uk/magna­carta/articles/magna­carta­an­introduction, accessed 8 December 
2015.
38 Ibid.
39 Parliement United Kingdom, “The Two-House System”, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/system/, accessed on 8 December 2015.
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system conducting both the legislation and scrutiny 
of governmental powers.
This analysis can also be drawn to the 
development of customary laws as they existed in 
the numerous communities of the world and this 
historical development is as long as the history of 
human kind.40 In those early times where there was 
no codified law by institutionalized organs of the 
state, people were governing themselves in a certain 
way and based on the cultures and customs of the 
communities that they came from.41 It must be noted 
that for thousands of years, customary and private 
legal systems alone regulated human activities. The 
obligation to behave in a certain way in a particular 
community became a customary law in that 
particular community the failure to observe result 
in a sort of sanction from the community against the 
deviant.42 This is so because behind customary law 
there is moral force to behave in a certain way. They 
became compulsory and have acquired the force of 
law with respect to the place or subject matter to 
which it related.43
Hence, the history as discussed above, paints 
a picture of what Austin was suggesting, in that 
the idea of a sovereign from whom the laws flow 
and the citizens have to obey them. But on the 
other hand, Hart’s criticism of Austin’s command 
theory ‘holds more water’ in that, as seen from the 
era of the Magna Carta and even development of 
customary laws, the ‘sovereign’ in as much as ‘he’ 
had the power to make laws, he was also bound by 
the same laws and was not above them. 
Hence, in unpacking Hart’s position: the 
executive in all its functions is checked by the 
legislature and the judiciary against excesses in its 
powers; the legislature on the other hand is checked 
by the judiciary and the executive against excesses. 
This in essence over-rules Austin’s postulation of a 
‘sovereign’ who is all ‘powerful’ and does not have 
to answer to anyone.
5. The Concept of Sovereign in International 
Law
International law which is also referred 
to as the law of nations, is a body of varied laws, 
norms and customs that apply between States and 
other international legal personalities recognized as 
international actors.44
International law does not have an enforcing 
entity or as Austin put is, a ‘sovereign’ and it is 
wholly a voluntary endeavor by States.45 This is a 
concept that has been adjudicated by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘PCIJ’) in the Lotus case, where the court 
stated that:
International law governs the relations 
between independent States. The rules of 
law binding upon States therefore emanate 
from their own free will as expressed 
in Conventions or by usages generally 
accepted as expressing principles of law […] 
Restrictions upon the independence of States 
cannot therefore be presumed.46
Moreover, enforcement power in international 
law only exists when States consent to be bound 
by an agreement e.g. treaties are considered to be 
binding as between States that conclude them.47 
Further, international law is a stand-alone system 
which is not under the legal orders of States. It is 
different in a number of ways: For instance, The UN 
Charter in its Preamble sets the main objective of 
the United Nations which is aimed at establishing 
40 Abdo M. And Abegaz G., “Theories and history of Customary law”, http://www.abyssinialaw.com/study­on­line/item/449­theories­and­
history­of­customary­law, accessed on 14 November 2016.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 See, Encyclopedia Britannica, “International Law”, http://www.britannica.com/topic/international­law, accessed on 9 December 2015. 
See also HG.org, “Legal Resources, International Law”, http://www.hg.org/international­law.html , accessed on 9 December 2015. United 
Nations, “Uphold International Law”, http://www.un.org/en/sections/what­we­do/uphold­international­law/, accessed on 9 December 2015.
45 Ibid.
46 See Case S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey, Judgment), Permanent Court of Int’l Justice, ser.A No.10, 1927, para. 44.
47 Article 2 (1) (a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also, Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1997.
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conditions under which respect and good faith must 
be exercised in relation to obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law.48
The objective of the UN Charter as mentioned 
is enforced in a number of ways e.g. through 
courts, tribunals, multilateral treaties - and by the 
Security Council, which can approve peacekeeping 
missions, impose sanctions, or authorize the use of 
force when there is a threat to international peace 
and security.49 In essence, the UN Charter stands out 
as a representative of international law in general. A 
reading of Chapter XVI, Article 103 of the United 
Nations Charter, provides that the obligations 
under the UN Charter overrides the terms of 
any other treaty. Further, its Preamble affirms 
establishment of the obligations out of treaties 
and source of international law. This is anchored 
by the fact that Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute 
recognizes international conventions as sources of 
law and the UN Charter rightfully falls under this 
categorizations, thereby making it a representative 
of international law per se.
Moreover, Austin’s assertion of international 
law not being ‘real law’ because of the lack of a 
‘sovereign’ may be true to some extent but on the 
other hand an analysis of this is necessary to deduce 
the truthfulness of his assertion. As extrapolated 
above, the will/consent of States is the basis of 
international law as a basis for obligations of States. 
This is explicit for treaties which States have to 
consent to be bound to and it is implicit as well 
for customary international law with which States 
through consensus agree to be bound.50
The General Assembly of the United Nations, 
which consists of representatives of some 193 
States, elicits a lot of similarity to the legislature 
but, it does not have powers to issue binding laws 
and instead it issues resolutions that serve only as 
recommendations. This may only be different in 
the aspect of internal matters of the UN, such as 
determining the UN budget with which it can issue 
binding resolutions in relation to its staff members.51 
Further, to some extent, international law 
lacks an enforcement jurisdiction on cases before 
it.52 The ICJ’s jurisdiction in contentious cases is 
hinged on the consent of only the states involved.53 
There is no international police force or 
an established mechanism of law enforcement, 
as well as no supreme executive authority. The 
Security Council can request for military action for 
the enforcement of peace and security but this is 
hinged on the fact that there must be a prior act of 
aggression or the threat of such an act.54 Moreover, 
any such enforcement action can be vetoed by any 
of the Council’s permanent members.55 
Hence, as analyzed, international law lacks 
a proper ‘sovereign’ authority to enforce it. But 
on the other hand, aspects of ‘sovereign power’ 
can be traced to certain provisions of the UN 
Charter. Article 5 of the UN Charter provides that 
the Security Council can suspend a member from 
the United Nations if preventive measures have 
been taken by the Council against such a member. 
Further, members that violate the obligations of 
the UN Charter may have non-military sanctions56 
imposed on them or military action enforced on 
them.57
The Security Council powers as indicated 
48 United Nations, Loc. cit.
49 Article 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, which is considered an international treaty that is binding among member States; See also, United 
Nations, “Definition of key terms used in the UN Treaty Collection”, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/
page1_en.xml, accessed on 14 November 2015.
50 Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the ICJ. See also Cassese A., 2005, International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 153-212. See Shaw 
Malcom N., 2008, International Law, Grotius Publications Ltd, Cambridge, pp. 69-128.
51 Effect of awards of compensation made by the UN Administrative Tribunal in Advisory Opinion International Court of Justice 13 July 1954. 
See also, Encyclopedia Britannica, Op. cit.
52 Certain Expenses of the United Nations see in article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter. See also Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice, 
20 July 1962. See also, Encyclopedia Britannica, Loc. cit.
53 Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ.
54 Article 42 of the UN Charter.
55 Article 23 of the UN Charter.
56 Article 41 of the UN Charter.
57 Article 42 of the UN Charter.
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could be deduced to mean ‘sovereign’ sanctions and 
hence opposing Austin’s view that international law 
lacks a proper ‘sovereign’ that can provide sanctions. 
As rightfully put by H.L.A Hart, a legislator always 
exhibits two personalities: his legislative personality, 
which is tasked with giving the command, and his 
ordinary personality, as a citizen, which is bound to 
obey the commands given. 
In this case, States that become members 
of the United Nations exhibit two personalities as 
well, the legislative personality that produces non-
binding resolutions in international conferences; 
and the ordinary personality in that by virtue of 
voluntarily becoming members of the UN, States 
are bound to respect the objectives of the UN 
Charter of maintaining international peace and 
security of which the Security Council is tasked as 
the ‘Sovereign’ of ensuring adherence to the same.58
Hence, Austin’s insistence on a ‘Sovereign’ 
as discussed earlier cannot be deduced in any 
municipal legal system, apart from what was known 
as the Middle Ages. Municipal legal systems indeed 
have a sovereign in the name of the executive, but 
even the so called sovereign is bound by the laws 
that it creates and hence as it makes laws, so it 
must abide by them or as the English philosophers 
rightfully put it, ‘As you make your bed, so you 
must lie on it.’ The same concept applies to the 
international legal system, inasmuch as States 
are equally sovereign,59 they must abide by the 
objectives of the United Nations once they become 
members and the same applies to non-members 
too.60 They must adhere to the rules in good faith,61 
failure to which sanctions may be imposed on them 
by the ‘Sovereign’ mandated to do so (Security 
Council). It must be noted that members of the 
Security Council are also members of the United 
Nations and they are also bound by the objectives 
of the United Nations Charter.
6. Questions of International Law
John Austin compared international law to 
a system of by-laws that bind a members club.62 
This was premised on the fact that international 
law has no ‘real’ sovereign’ but as analyzed in this 
article, the system propounded by Austin was one 
that existed in the Middle Ages and no longer exists 
now.
A further counter-argument against Austin’s 
assertion that international law is not real law63 is 
that in any system of law in the world, questions 
of international law are always treated as legal 
questions in the international arena. A brief 
analysis of this will be undertaken so as to show 
how international law has dealt with the issue of 
‘questions of international law’.
7. Dispute Settlement in International Law
Article 33 (1) of the UN Charter for provides 
the various dispute settlement mechanisms 
which include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. 
Article 94 (1) of the Charter further provides for 
the compliance with the decisions of the ICJ by the 
State parties involved in it as also provided for in 
Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ.
It must be noted further that the law applied 
in judicial determination of disputes is international 
law and not domestic law. This supports the assertion 
that questions of international law are always treated 
as questions of law in the international judicial 
mechanisms. The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as 
‘ICTY’) in the Blaskic case64 stated that:
The Appeals Chamber wishes to emphasize 
at the outset that the Prosecutor’s reasoning, 
58 See, Articles 2 (5); Article 5, Article 11 (3), Article 12, Article 24, Article 25, Article 26, Article 33, Article 36, Article 37, Article 39, Article 
41, Article 42 of the UN Charter.
59 Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter.
60 Article 2 (6) of the UN Charter.
61 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also Article 2 (2) of the UN Charter.
62 John Austin, Op. cit., p. 171.
63 Ibid.
64 See Case Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 29 October 1997, para. 40.
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adopted by the Trial Chamber in its subpoena 
decision is clearly based on what could be 
called “the domestic analogy” […] Hence, the 
transposition into the international community 
of legal institutions constructs or approaches 
prevailing in national law may be a source 
of great confusion and misapprehension. 
In addition to causing opposition among 
States, it could end up blurring the distinctive 
features of international courts.
To adopt the tribunal’s reasoning into my 
analysis, basically the court was of the view 
that domestic laws cannot be transposed into 
international law as this would lead to endless 
conflicts between States and in essence convert 
international courts into ‘domestic courts’ of some 
sort. Hence, the tribunal was in principle creating 
a demarcation between domestic and international 
law and the fact that disputes between States should 
be dealt with by international law and not their 
individual domestic laws.
The decision by the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY confirms the assertion that discounts Austin’s 
position that international law is not real law. The 
tribunal in principle was confirming the existence 
of international law.
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the ICJ 
further firms up the existence of international law 
by providing the sources of international law: 
international conventions; international customs, 
general principles of law and judicial decisions 
as well as teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists. Hence, as envisaged by the ICJ Statute, 
indeed, international law does exist and the same 
can be deduced from within the international law 
framework to prove its own existence.
8. Practicality of Legal Questions/ Disputes 
in International Law
The matter of legal questions/disputes before 
international courts has produced consistent results 
time and time again, confirming that indeed legal 
questions in international law are dealt with within 
the realm of international legal system.
In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 
case, the PCIJ gave a broad definition of what a 
legal dispute is:
A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law 
or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests 
between two persons.65
In another case, the ICJ referred to ‘a situation 
in which the two sides held clearly opposite views 
concerning the question of the performance or non-
performance of certain treaty obligations.’66 The 
International Arbitral Tribunal in Texaco v. Libya 
referred to a ‘present divergence of interests and 
opposition of legal views’.67
International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (hereinafter referred to as ‘ICSID’) 
tribunals have also adopted similar descriptions of 
‘disputes’, often relying on the PCIJ’s and ICJ’s 
definitions.68 Hence, it is deduced that the existence 
of a legal dispute of an international character must 
be accompanied by some communication which 
demonstrates the existence of opposing international 
demands and denials between States. This what the 
PCIJ postulated in Mavrommatis when it referred 
to a ‘conflict of legal views or of interests between 
two persons’.69
Further, in the Northern Cameroons Case, 
the Court was of the view that “Whether there exists 
an international dispute is a matter for objective 
65 See The Case Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Great Britain) Ser.A. No.2 at 11, 30 August 1924. 
66 Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion of ICJ.
67 See The Case Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. Libyan Arab Republic, Preliminary Award of 27 
November 1975, 53 ILR 389, at 416 (1979).
68 Case Maffezini v. Spain, Decision on Jurisdiction of 25 January 2000, 40 ILM 1129, at para. 93, 94; Case Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004, at para. 106, 107; Case Lucchetti v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Award 
of 7 February 2005, at para. 48; Case Impregilo v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3,Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 April 2005, at para. 302, 
303; Case AES v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of 26 April 2005, at para. 43; Case El Paso Energy Intl. 
Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 April 2006, at para. 61; Case Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas 
de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of 
16 May 2006, at para. 29; Case M.C.I. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award of 31 July 2007, at para. 63.
69 Schreuer C, “What is A Legal Dispute?”, in Buffard, et al., 2008, International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation. Festschrift in 
Honour of Gerhard Hafner, Koninklijke Brill New York, p. 965.
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determination” and a dispute exists if a situation has 
arisen “in which the two sides hold clearly opposite 
views concerning the question of the performance 
or non-performance of certain treaty obligations.”70 
The Court has maintained this view in other cases 
as well.71
Hence, from the foregoing analysis, a legal 
dispute in international law is one which annihilates 
Austin’s, assertion against the validity of international 
law. His grounding is rather a confounding one since 
he did not provide a foundation upon which his 
assertion could be based. The aspect of a sovereign 
as analyzed there before has no bearing even within 
the domestic legal system let alone international 
law. Hence, the international judicial systems have 
also time and time again proven the existence of an 
international legal dispute settlement mechanism 
within international law.
C. Conclusion 
John Austin in his book, ‘The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined’72, goes to great lengths 
to establish what is known as the ‘command 
theory’; in that a law is only true law if it has a true 
‘sovereign’ to enforce it and the ‘sovereign’ is not 
bound by the law.
This assertion has been meticulously dissec-
ted by various critics and supports alike who have 
taken different views as to what Austin really 
meant. Some have taken the position that Austin 
meant the totality of the law making institution as 
the ‘sovereign’ and not individualistic power, while 
others have said that his assertion should be taken 
to connote democracy, ‘law of the people, for the 
people and by the people.’ 
The support for Austin’s assertion is by no 
means easy to ignore. But on the other hand, Hart 
came forth and stated that the ‘command theory’ 
is an illusion. He stated that there exists no legal 
system as suggested by Austin. This is because in 
as much as for instance, legislators are tasked with 
the duty of creating laws, they are bound to obey 
them. Basically, no one is above the law, even the 
‘sovereign’ ‘himself’. 
Kelsen also critiqued Austin and indicated 
that if the ‘sovereign’ holds the command powers, 
then this would essentially mean that, should the 
sovereign die, the law ‘dies’ as well. Hence, Kelsen 
went further to indicate that the law as we know 
it exists in a system of continuity. It is a constant 
and even if the ‘sovereign’ dies, the law continues to 
exist as a constant unless repealed. Kelsen’s position 
was basically that the notion of the ‘sovereign’ 
making the law and not obeying it as a totality was 
misconceived as this would essentially mean that 
with the advent of a new ‘sovereign’, the laws will 
have to change which is not the case in any legal 
system.
Austin’s position has further been discounted 
by the fact that no system conforms to his ‘command 
theory.’ Hart went forth to analyze the aspect of 
sanctions as a ‘sovereign’ tool to ensure obedience 
to the law. The aspect of sanctions has its grounding 
in international law as well as in domestic law and as 
Fitzmaurice puts it, ‘international law is not binding 
because it is enforced; it is enforced because it is 
binding.’73 
 Furthermore, in my analysis I have asserted 
to the fact that Austin’s assertion has been overtaken 
by time in modern contemporary legal systems. If it 
was in the Middle Ages, the ‘command theory’ by 
a ‘sovereign’ would have explicitly made sense as 
envisaged by the powers held by the pharaohs and 
roman leaders. But that has changed over time and 
the ‘sovereign’ themselves are under an obligation 
to obey the powers that they enact. No one is above 
the law. The same concept applies in international 
law as well, in that for instance, States have a duty 
70 Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 2 December 1963, 1963 ICJ 
Rep. 15, at 27.
71 Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case, International Court of Justice, Rep. 65, at 74, 1950.
72 John Austin., Loc. cit.
73 See, G.G Fitzmaurice., Loc. cit.; See also, John Dugard, Op. cit., p. 10.
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to honor treaties in good faith as well as ensure 
compliance with their international obligations 
under the UN Charter and any violation of the same 
may lead to sanctions under international law. This 
in essence shows that international law and domestic 
laws are not different in any way, they are similar 
for every purpose and intent save for their subjects.
In addition, just as legal questions in domestic 
legal systems are handled by domestic courts using 
domestic laws; legal questions in international law 
are handled by international legal systems using 
international law. The similarity is glaringly similar 
to ignore as to the existence of international law as 
a ‘proper law’.
In summation, Austin’s assertion is important 
in that is helps firm up the foundation on which 
international law rests upon as a proper system on 
law. International law is indeed true law, not just for 
the sake of it, but to allude to Austin’s terms, ‘it has 
a sovereign and it is not similar to the by-laws of a 
member’s club. It is the ‘law of nations’ as Jeremy 
Bentham puts it.74
74 Jeremy Bentham, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, in J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, 1970, The Collected Works 
of Jeremy Bentham : An Introduction to The Principle of Morals and Legislation, London, p. 100. See also, C. Kenny, “Jeremy Bentham, 
Principles of International Law”, http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2015/08/principles-of-international-law-bentham.html#1 , accessed 14 
November 2015.
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